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Trustworthy data repositories  ensure the security of  their  collections.  We argue they should also 
ensure the security of  researcher and human subject data. Here we demonstrate the use of  a privacy  
impact assessment (PIA) to evaluate potential privacy risks to researchers using the ICPSR’s Open 
Badges Research Credential System as a case study. We present our workfow and discuss potential 
privacy risks and mitigations for those risks.
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Privacy Considerations in Digital Repositories
Digital repositories and collections are often characterized by their trustworthiness (Donaldson 
and Conway 2015; Colati and Colati 2009; CRL, The Center for Research Libraries 2007; 
Corrado 2019). A repository’s components that determine its trustworthiness include digital 
object management, technical infrastructure, security, and organizational infrastructure  (CRL, 
The Center for Research Libraries 2007). Audits of trustworthiness (e.g. ISO 16363:2012 
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 2012); the earlier Trustworthy Repositories 
Audit & Certifcation checklist (CRL, The Center for Research Libraries 2007); CoreTrustSeal 
(L’Hours, Kleemola, and Leeuw 2019)) typically focus on evaluating a repository’s stability in 
service of its data contents: how might a data depositor know that this repository is a place that 
can be trusted to host their digital objects?
We recognize that the security of a repository’s holdings is paramount, but suggest that there 
is another aspect of trustworthiness that must also be considered: how a repository handles and 
manages user data. This data might range from email addresses of user accounts; to institutional 
affliation or other biographical information requuired for access to sensitive data; to search 
histories, clickstreams, and other trace usage data. In some regions repositories are legally 
requuired to consider the privacy of their users’ data in their design (e.g. Europe’s General Data 
Protection Regulation requuires systems processing personal information, including repositories, 
to adhere to its “data protection by design” and “data protection by default” requuirements 
(“Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament (General Data Protection 
Regulation)” 2016)), yet few frameworks or checklists exist to assist repository managers in 
analyzing the privacy risks for researchers accessing data in digital repositories. For instance, 
while the TRAC checklist considers aspects of the repository’s organizational structure (e.g., 
fnancial sustainability, procedural accountability), they do not address repositories’ policies and 
procedures for managing information that their users and processes generate.
In this paper, we present a case study of a privacy impact assessment conducted as part of 
the development of the “Open Badges and Research Credentials System” (OBRCS) 
(Levenstein, Tyler, and Bleckman 2018). This digital credentialing system would lessen the 
administrative overhead of accessing sensitive or restricted data repositories by providing 
researchers with a “passport” valid for multiple repositories. Because this system would requuire 
sharing and storing user data, a privacy impact assessment was of paramount importance. We 
describe our workfow, privacy risks we identifed, and discuss design, technical, and policy 
mitigation strategies and recommendations for digital repository credentialing systems. We 
believe this approach and fndings could be benefcial to other repositories or credentialing 
systems.
Privacy Impact Assessment of OBRCS
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic approach for determining privacy risks of an 
information system and mitigations for those risks (Wright 2013). In many countries, PIAs have 
become a requuired or recommended step for the design of information systems that process 
personally-identifable information (PII) (Wright and De Hert 2012). For instance, the E-
Government Act of 2002 requuires U.S. government agencies to conduct PIAs in the 
development or procurement of systems processing PII; Europe’s GDPR requuires a “Data 
Protection Impact Assessment” when a new system is likely to pose privacy risks. Many 
companies have adopted PIAs as part of their design processes (Wright and De Hert 2012). For 
digital repositories, PIAs can be used to reveal potential risks to both a system’s data subjects and 
its users. We adapted Wright’s PIA methodology (Wright 2013), which synthesizes best 
practices, into fve phases tailored for the digital repository environment.
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Phase I: Threshold Assessment and Preparation
The frst phase is determining whether a PIA is necessary, and if so, who will conduct the PIA 
and with what timeline, scope, and budget. For the OBRCS project (Levenstein, Tyler, and 
Bleckman 2018), a PIA was necessary because the centralized management of researcher 
credentials entails the collection, storage and transfer of PII.
Phase II: Repository Description and Information Flows
The second phase is to map the system’s components and information fows: what information is 
collected, stored, processed, and made available in different aspects of a repository. This entails 
describing the repository’s purpose, functionality, and stakeholders; the information the 
repository collects from what stakeholder and why; how information is used or processed; and 
how this information is stored and managed.
For the OBRCS PIA, we identifed information fows by frst interviewing multiple key 
stakeholders (OBRCS project manager, senior data project manager, application manager). We 
also consulted with two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) offcers, as some information in the 
system may be subject to FOIA requuests. We also reviewed the project’s description (see 
Levenstein, Tyler, and Bleckman 2018) and security assessments of ICPSR’s broader data 
repository management system, Archonnex. Finally, we documented what information needed 
to be provided when using Archonnex, what information was displayed, and any options for 
users to manage that information. The identifed information fows were documented through 
system fow diagrams visualizing how information dfows’ between different entities; and through 
step-by-step process models showing information exchanges in different parts of the system.
Phase III: Privacy Risk Analysis
Based on identifed information fows, the next step is to identify how the system could impact 
the privacy of its stakeholders. This may involve additional interviews with relevant 
stakeholders. Information fows and interview fndings are then used to identify scenarios in 
which information might be misused. These scenarios are documented, including an assessment 
of how likely each scenario might be, and respective consequuences.
We interviewed 8 additional stakeholders (3 potential users, 1 data repository “gatekeeper”, 
3 ICPSR staff managing data use agreements, 1 institution’s offcial representative). We grouped 
risks based on the stakeholder impacted (researchers, data subjects, data repository’s institution). 
We estimated the likelihood of these risks to generally be low, though the severity of any of these 
scenarios coming to pass could be high. These include:
• Passport holders being unfairly or mistakenly denied access to data. 
This could impair passport holders’ ability to conduct research.
• Physical or emotional harm to passport holders. 
Passport holders could be targeted by “bad” actors, e.g., other researchers seeking to 
“scoop” a project or outside groups targeting researchers working on politically-charged topics.
• Reputational harm to passport holders. 
If a researcher is denied access to restricted data, unfairly or not, they could be labeled as 
being untrustworthy.
• Undue access to human subjects data. 
If a researcher is inappropriately granted access to human subjects data, this could 
potentially put human subjects at risk.
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• Distrust of  OBRCS, and by extension, institutions that use OBRCS. 
Any of the above harms coming to pass could cause researchers to lose trust in OBRCS.
Phase IV: Mitigation Strategies and Recommendations
After identifying risks, the next phase is to develop mitigation strategies. These can be technical 
(changes to the system) or organizational (internal and external policies). The PIA should 
present a holistic view of recommended mitigation strategies to serve as consistent guidance for 
system developers and designers. The PIA’s recommendations serves to evaluate and prioritize 
among possible mitigation steps. An important aspect in providing recommendations is to 
balance privacy considerations with system needs.
We identifed 17 mitigation strategies, including design solutions (e.g., do not include past 
infractions in a researcher’s profle), technical solutions (e.g., applying multi-factor 
authentication) and policy solutions (e.g., auditing fairness of data access decisions), which we 
will describe in the talk and full version of the paper.
Phase V: Implementation, Publication, and Iteration
The PIA’s fndings are documented in a report which guides the implementation of 
recommended mitigations. The report should be frequuently updated to refect the 
implementation of mitigations in the repository, and revisited as new features are added to the 
system, and as new stakeholders, uses, information fows, and data types arise.
Discussion & Conclusion
Our work makes several contributions for the digital curation community. First, the workfow 
we describe, adapted from , will likely be directly usable by other repositories – particularly as 
more institutions and countries increase emphasis on user data protection. Though our PIA 
focused on privacy risks to researchers using this system, this method is appropriate for 
identifying and mitigating privacy risks for any sensitive information, including PII about 
research subjects. Methods of restricting or preventing access to PII often rely on the researcher 
or data depositor; the PIA could instead be used by repository managers for a more centralized 
assessment of privacy risks. Second, our PIA identifed risks that may be present in other digital 
repositories – particularly for those including sensitive or restricted data. Other repositories 
relying on credentialing services may similarly wish to consider mitigations for the risk of 
unfairly denying researchers access to data – or to providing undue access to data. Finally, our 
work expands notions of trustworthiness for repository managers and users. A trustworthy data 
repository should ensure the security of all information that fows through a system – not just the 
data it stores. Ensuring the security of repository user data will only become more important as 
more repositories adopt credentialing systems like OBRCS or develop new digital “enclaves” 
dependent on user profles.
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